Limitation Act of 1963 Notes for Judiciary [Download PDF]

Overview: Limitation Act 1963 is an important subject on all Judiciary Exams, it is asked in all state judiciary exams and therefore if you are an aspirant preparing for Judiciary Exams you need to ensure that you prepare Limitation Act for Judiciary properly. In most Judiciary exams prelims and mains the questions from limitation act are asked directly, however questions from landmark case laws are also asked. In this blog you will get all the important sections, case laws and sample questions for your practice.

In this blog we will cover:

1. Notes of Limitation Act
2. Download Notes for Judiciary
3. Important questions
4. Practice paper for Judiciary

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Introduction and Sailent features:

The term "limitation," in its literal sense, refers to a constraint, rule, or set of circumstances that impose restrictions. The concept of the law of limitation establishes specific time limits within which individuals seeking redress or justice must approach the court for various suits and proceedings.

It primarily involves setting or stipulating timeframes to bar legal actions. Section 2(j) of the Limitation Act, 1963, defines the "period of limitation" as the timeframe prescribed for any suit, appeal, or application according to the Act's Schedule. The "prescribed period" signifies the limitation period calculated in accordance with this Act.

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Halsbury's Laws of England outline the main objectives of the Law of Limitations as follows:

1. Discouraging long-dormant claims, as they tend to be more cruel than just.
2. Preventing defendants from losing evidence to dispute stale claims.
3. Encouraging individuals with valid causes of action to pursue them diligently.
4. Establishing two fundamental considerations underlying the Doctrine of Limitation and Prescription: firstly, rights that remain inactive for extended periods are deemed nonexistent, and secondly, rights related to property and those in general should not be subject to constant uncertainty, doubt, and suspense.

The primary objective behind limiting legal actions is to uphold the maxim 'interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium,' which translates to "it is in the interest of the State that there should be an end to litigation." This limitation serves to prevent disturbances or deprivations of rights acquired through equity, justice, prolonged enjoyment, or lost due to a party's inaction, negligence, or acquiescence.

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The underlying intention in adopting the concept of limitation is to ensure that disputes are confined to a specific timeframe, preventing them from becoming perpetual while individuals have finite lifespans.

In the case of B.B. & D. Mfg. Co. v. ESI Corporation, AIR 1972 SC 1935, the Supreme Court made an observation that highlights the purpose of statutes of limitations. These statutes aim to compel individuals to exercise their rights of action within a reasonable timeframe and discourage the pursuit of stale, fake, or fraudulent claims.

Statutes of limitations have two aspects: one relates to the extinguishment of the right if a claim or action is not initiated within a specified time, and the other merely bars the claim without affecting the underlying right. The right may either remain as a moral obligation or serve as the basis for a fresh enforceable obligation.

A statute that extinguishes the right affects substantive rights, while one that addresses the commencement of action without altering the right is considered procedural.

In the case of Balakrishnan v. M.A. Krishnamurthy (1998) 7 SCC 123, the Supreme Court further emphasized that the Limitation Act is grounded in public policy, aiming to establish a time limit for legal remedies in the interest of general welfare.

The Law of Limitation is not solely intended to nullify parties' rights but rather to encourage parties to seek remedies within a reasonable timeframe. It sets a lifespan for legal remedies to address injuries suffered by aggrieved individuals. This principle is encapsulated in the maxim 'interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium,' which means that the Law of Limitation serves the general welfare and ensures that every legal remedy remains viable for a legislatively defined period.

Section 3

Section 3 of the Limitation Act mandates that a court must dismiss any suit, appeal, or application filed after the expiration of the prescribed limitation period specified in the Schedule. This applies irrespective of whether the opposing party raised the plea of limitation. It is the court's duty not to proceed with an application that exceeds the prescribed limitation period.

The court has no discretion in this matter. If, during the interpretation of the relevant provisions of the Limitation Act or in determining the applicable provision of the Act, a subordinate court arrives at an erroneous decision, the higher court in a revision may intervene to correct this decision, as it affects the court's jurisdiction to proceed with the matter's determination.

Regarding the nature of the decree, even if it is true that the court is obligated to consider Section 3 of the Limitation Act and dismiss a suit when it is time-barred, if the court, without taking into account this provision, renders a decision on the merits of the case, the resulting decree is not considered a nullity.

Instead, it represents an error of law that can be rectified in accordance with the procedures outlined in the Code of Civil Procedure. Therefore, the decree or order cannot be deemed a nullity (as established in the case of Ittyavira Mathai v. Varkey Varkey, AIR 1964 SC 907).

Section 2 (j)

Section 2 (j) - Definition of Prescribed Period: "Prescribed period" refers to the period of limitation specified for any suit, appeal, or application in the Schedule, and "period of limitation" refers to the time limit calculated in accordance with the provisions of this Act (as established in Assam Urban Water Supply & Sewerage Board v/s Subash Projects & Mktg. Ltd., (2012) 2 SCC 624).

The Limitation Act does not result in the extinguishment of a right; rather, it merely bars the remedy. In the case of Bombay Dyeing & Mfg. Co. Ltd. v. State of Bombay, AIR 1958 SC 328, the Supreme Court, in paragraph 21, held that when a debt becomes time-barred, it does not become extinguished but only becomes unenforceable in a court of law.

Therefore, even after a debt is barred by limitation, it continues to exist, and the employer does not receive a legal discharge from the debt due to the limitation bar. The methods through which an obligation under a contract can be discharged are well-defined, and the limitation bar is not one of them.

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Section 4

Expiry of prescribed period when court is closed:

Where the prescribed period for any suit, appeal or application expires on a day when the court is closed, the suit, appeal or application may be Instituted, preferred or made on the day when the court reopens.

Explanation- A court shall be deemed to be closed on any day within the meaning of this section if during any part of its normal working hours it remains closed on that day.

Section 4 does not pertain to the duration of limitation. It does not extend the time limit for limitation but rather provides a concession. It allows for the filing of a suit, appeal, or application on the day the court reopens if the period of limitation expires on a day when the court is closed.

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Section 5

Extension of prescribed period in certain cases:

Any appeal or any application other than an application under any of the provisions of order 21 of the CPC, may be admitted after the prescribed period, if the appellant or applicant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period.

Explanation – The fact that appellant or the applicant was mislead by any order, practice or judgment of the High Court in ascertaining or computing the prescribed period may be a sufficient cause within a meaning of the sub-section.

Section 4 of the Limitation Act is also applicable to Criminal Appeals. A delay in filing a Criminal Appeal can be excused if it was mistakenly filed in another court. The Criminal Procedure Code is not considered a special law under Section 29 but is a general law governing procedures.

Under the Criminal Procedure Code, the delay in filing an appeal against acquittal can be condoned under Section 5. However, the appellate court must establish sufficient cause to condone the delay.

The Limitation Act of 1963, specifically Sections 4 and 5, deals with the extension of the prescribed period. Section 5 applies to appeals and applications but not to suits. No court or tribunal can extend the period of limitation for filing a suit. Even if a plaintiff can demonstrate a cause beyond their control, only Section 4 allows for an extension, particularly during court holidays.

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In cases where an application for setting aside an ex-parte decree is filed, the delay cannot be allowed without first condoning it. In a specific case where a petition was filed under Order 9 Rule 13 of the Civil Procedure Code, there was a delay of two years in filing the application, and no application for condonation of delay was submitted.

In the matter of State of West Bengal v. W.B. Judicial Service Association, 1990 (2) Cal. L.J. 73, the court held that the doctrine of equality, while important, may warrant different treatment for the government in Section 5 of the Limitation Act.

The court cited reasons for adopting a more liberal approach towards the government, including the fact that government decisions are collective and institutional, affecting public interest rather than individuals. Government decisions are often encumbered by bureaucratic processes, leading to procedural delays.

The court acknowledged that it might be unrealistic to treat government and private parties the same way in these matters and recognized the need for some latitude in government cases.

In the case of National Insurance Company v. Smt. Runiya Binha, 2008(3) JCR 456 (Jhr), it was emphasized that the requirement of filing a condonation application along with the memo of appeal is mandatory. The court should grant condonation of delay in filing an appeal only in exceptional cases.

In the case of Special Tehsildar, Land Acquisition Kerala v. K.V. Aiyusuma, 1996(10) SCC 634, where the Government sought condonation of delay, the Supreme Court ruled that while Section 5 of the Limitation Act requires an explanation for the delay to the satisfaction of the court, there should be no distinction made between the State and the citizen.

However, adopting a strict standard of proof would lead to a serious miscarriage of public justice and could be exploited to manipulate delays in the appeal process. Therefore, the court's approach should be pragmatic rather than overly rigid.

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Section 6

Legal Disability:

(1) Where a person entitled to institute a suit or make an application for the execution of a decree is, at the time from which the prescribed period is to be reckoned, a minor or insane, or an idiot, he may institute the suit or make the application within the same period after the disability has ceases, as would otherwise have been allowed from the time specified therefore in the third column of the Schedule.

(2) Where such person is, at the time from which the prescribed period it to be reckoned, affected by two such disabilities, or where, before his disability has ceased, he is affected by another disability, he may institute the suit or make the application within the same period after both disabilities have ceased, as would otherwise have been allowed from the time so specified.

(3) Where the disability continues up to the death of that person, his legal representative may institute the suit or make the application within the same period after the death, as would otherwise have been allowed from the time so specified.

(4) Where the legal representative referred to in sub-section (3) is, at the date of the death of the person whom he represents. affected by any such disability, the rules contained in sub-sections (1) and (2) shall apply. (5) Where a person under disability dies after the disability ceases but within the period allowed to him under this section, his legal representative may institute the suit or make the application within the same period after the death, as would otherwise have been available to that person had he not died.

Explanation - For the purposes of this section 'minor' includes a child in the womb.

Section 6 is specifically applicable to suits or applications for the execution of decrees. It does not encompass situations such as an application under Order 21 Rule 90 of the CPC to set aside a sale conducted in execution of a decree. Furthermore, it does not extend to applications for the readmission of an appeal under Order 41 Rule 10 of the CPC. It's important to note that Sections 6, 7, and 8 complement each other and are not mutually exclusive.

Section 7

Disability of one of several persons:

Where one of several persons jointly entitled to institute a suit or make an application for the execution of a decree is under any such disability, and a discharge can be given without the concurrence of such person, time will run against them all; but when no such discharge can be given, time will not run as against any of them until one of them becomes capable of giving such discharge without the concurrence of the others or until the disability has ceased.

Explanation I: This Section applies to a discharge from every kind of liability including a liability in respect of any immovable property.

Explanation II: For the purposes of this section the manager of a Hindu undivided family governed by the Mitakshara law shall be deemed to be capable of giving a discharge, without the concurrence of the other members of the family only if he is in management of the Joint family property.

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In the case of Narayan v. Babasaheb, reported in 2016(2) JBCJ 415 (SC) and (2016) 6 SCC 725, the situation was as follows:

Facts: A Hindu man, the original owner of ancestral property, passed away, leaving behind two sons, one of whom was a minor at the time, along with four daughters and his widow. The widow (D2) executed a sale deed in favor of another party (D1) on two occasions, first on 20.1.1982 and then on 28.11.1988, for the same property.

In 1989, the sons and daughters filed a suit to recover possession of the property and set aside the sale deed executed by their mother (D2), who was named as a defendant, and the purchaser (D1).

The first appellate court ruled that Article 60 of the Limitation Act did not apply in this case since D2 was not the guardian appointed by the Court.

The key question was whether the suit was time-barred, considering:

Article 60, which prescribes a limitation of 3 years after the ward attains majority to set aside the transfer of property made by the guardian of a ward. or Article 109, which prescribes a limitation of 12 years when the suit is filed by a Hindu governed by the Mitakshara Law to set aside an alienation made by the father of his ancestral property.

Held: The court concluded that Article 60 was applicable in this case, and not Article 109.

Section 8

Special Exceptions:

Section 6 and Section 7 do not apply to suits intended to enforce pre-emption rights. Furthermore, they should not be construed as extending the limitation period for any suit or application beyond three years from the point when the disability ends or the affected person passes away.

The combined effect of Section 6 and Section 8, when considered along with the third column of the relevant Article in the Limitation Act, means that a person under disability may file a suit within the same timeframe that would otherwise be permitted as per the third column of the schedule. However, it is important to note the special limitation provided in Section 8 as an exception, stipulating that the extended period following the end of the disability must not exceed three years from the cessation of the disability or the death of the disabled person.

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Kolandavel Gounder v. Chinnapan, AIR 1965 Madras 541

Facts: In 1940, a father sold joint family property on behalf of himself and his minor sons. Subsequently, in 1942, the purchaser of the property made a further sale. Possession of the property was transferred to the alienee on August 17, 1942. The sons, who were born in 1928, 1931, and on August 13, 1937, filed a suit on January 9, 1958. They argued that the 12-year limitation period (as specified by Article 126) should commence either from the date when the youngest son reached majority or, alternatively, when the eldest son assumed the role of property manager after their father's death in April 1948. They contended that the limitation period should only start running against all of them from April 1948.

Held: After a careful examination of Sections 6, 7, and 8, it is evident that Section 8 places a restriction on the concession granted under Sections 6 and 7, limiting it to a maximum of three years after the cessation of the disability. Therefore, the three-year period should be calculated from the date when the eldest son attained majority in 1946. Consequently, the suit is time-barred due to limitation.

Section 8 serves as a complementary and restrictive provision in relation to the concessions offered by Sections 6 and 7. It does not confer any significant privilege and operates more like a proviso to Sections 6 and 7.

Section 9

Continuous Running of Time:

Once the period of limitation has commenced, it continues to run without interruption, and subsequent disabilities or inability to file a suit or application do not halt it. However, there is an exception provided for cases where letters of administration to the estate of a creditor have been granted to the debtor. In such instances, the running of the limitation period for a suit to recover the debt is suspended for the duration of the administration.

Limitation cannot commence unless the cause of action has arisen. A cause of action typically arises when there are parties involved—one who can bring the suit and another who can be sued—and when all relevant facts have occurred, which are necessary to prove the plaintiff's case. If time has begun to run due to the right to sue becoming available to a person without any legal disability, subsequent disabilities affecting that person, their son, or other representatives do not exempt them from the ordinary limitation rules.

Section 10

Suits Against Trustees and Their Representatives:

Notwithstanding the provisions of this Act, there is no time limit for a suit against a person in whom property has become vested in trust for a specific purpose, or against their legal representatives or assigns (except for assigns for valuable consideration). Such suits are allowed regardless of how much time has passed. This section also considers property involved in Hindu, Muslim, or Buddhist religious or charitable endowments to be treated as property vested in trust for a specific purpose, with the property manager being deemed the trustee.

Section 11

Suits on Contracts Entered into Outside the Territories:

(1) Suits filed within the territories covered by this Act, for contracts made in the State of Jammu and Kashmir or in a foreign country, shall be subject to the limitation rules contained in this Act.

(2) Any limitation rule existing in the State of Jammu and Kashmir or in a foreign country cannot be used as a defense in a suit filed within the mentioned territories for a contract made in that State or in a foreign country, unless:

a. The rule has extinguished the contract; and

b. The parties were domiciled in that State or the foreign country during the period prescribed by that rule.

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Section 12

Exclusion of time in legal proceedings

A suit for the recovery of a loan must be filed within three years from the date the loan was granted. If a hand-note receipt is dated 5.9.1991, and the suit is filed on 5th September 1994, it falls within the time limit because the date of the hand-note, i.e., 5.9.1991, is excluded when calculating the limitation period.

In the case of a suit for the recovery of money based on a promissory note, the note was executed on 12.04.2000, so the suit should have been filed by 12.04.2003, considering the exclusion of the date of execution of the promissory note as per Section 12 of the Limitation Act. However, there were general holidays between 12.04.2003 and 15.04.2003. Therefore, the suit filed on 16.04.2003 is not barred by limitation.

The time required for obtaining a certified copy of the judgment and decree is excluded from the computation of the limitation period. However, any delay caused by the party's carelessness or negligence in applying for a copy or in paying the necessary fees for obtaining the copy cannot be excluded.

Regarding the time between the delivery of the judgment and the signing of the decree, there is typically an interval. In calculating the time required for obtaining a copy of the decree or order, any time taken by the court to prepare the decree or order before the application for a copy is made should not be excluded. Only the time required if the application is made can be excluded as the time requisite, without regard to the date of the application for copies.

Section 13

Exclusion of Time in Cases of Pauper Application:

When determining the limitation period for any suit or appeal, if an application for leave to sue or appeal as a pauper has been made and subsequently rejected, the time spent by the applicant in genuinely pursuing this application for such leave shall not be counted. Additionally, the court, upon payment of the court-fees required for such suit or appeal, may treat it as if the court-fees were initially paid.

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Section 14

Exclusion of Time Spent in Proceedings Without Jurisdiction:

(1) When calculating the limitation period for a suit, the time in which the plaintiff has diligently pursued another civil proceeding against the defendant, whether in a court of first instance, appeal, or revision, shall be excluded. This exclusion applies when the other proceeding pertains to the same issue and is pursued in good faith in a court that, due to a lack of jurisdiction or similar reasons, cannot entertain it.

(2) When determining the limitation period for an application, the time during which the applicant has diligently pursued another civil proceeding against the same party for the same relief in a court of first instance, appeal, or revision shall be excluded. This exclusion applies when the other proceeding is pursued in good faith in a court that, due to a lack of jurisdiction or similar reasons, cannot entertain it.

(3) Despite the provisions of Rule 2 of Order XXIII of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, subsection (1) applies to a new suit initiated with the court's permission under that Rule. This permission is granted when the first suit is expected to fail due to a jurisdictional defect or a similar cause.

Explanation: a. When excluding the time spent in a prior civil proceeding, both the day it began and the day it concluded are counted. b. A plaintiff or applicant who opposes an appeal is considered to be pursuing a proceeding. c. Misjoinder of parties or causes of action is considered a similar cause to a jurisdictional defect for the purpose of this section.

The benefit provided by Section 14 is not applicable in criminal proceedings.

The second lawsuit is not considered a continuation of the first one, and the limitation period must be calculated anew for the second lawsuit. Only the period during which the plaintiff genuinely pursued the lawsuit in another court is relevant and can be excluded.

Section 14 pertains to the exclusion of time, while Section 5 deals with the condonation of delay.

In the case of Commissioner, M.P. Housing Board and Ors v. M/S Mohan Lal and Company, 2016 SCC Online SC 738, it was held that filing an application under Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996, for the appointment of an arbitrator, is distinct from lodging an objection to an award under Section 34 of the 1996 Act.

These actions occur at different stages, one at the initiation stage, and the other at the culmination stage. Consequently, these proceedings do not pertain to the "same matter in issue," and thus, Section 14 does not apply.

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Section 15

Exclusion of time in certain other cases:

(1) When calculating the period of limitation for any suit or application for the execution of a decree that has been stayed by injunction or order, the time during which the injunction or order was in force, the day it was issued or made, and the day it was withdrawn shall be excluded.

(2) When calculating the period of limitation for any suit that requires prior notice or the consent or sanction of the Government or any other authority according to prevailing laws, the period of such notice or the time needed to obtain consent or sanction shall be excluded. In this calculation, the date of application for consent or sanction and the date of receipt of the Government or authority's order shall both be counted.

(3) When calculating the period of limitation for any suit or application for the execution of a decree by a receiver, interim receiver appointed during insolvency proceedings, or by a liquidator or provisional liquidator in winding-up proceedings, the time starting from the initiation of such proceedings and ending three months after the appointment of the receiver or liquidator shall be excluded.

(4) When calculating the period of limitation for a suit seeking possession by a purchaser from a sale in execution of a decree, the time during which proceedings to set aside the sale have been pursued shall be excluded.

(5) When calculating the period of limitation for any suit, the time during which the defendant has been absent from India and territories outside India under the administration of the Central Government shall be excluded.

In cases where a stay order has been issued against the filing of a suit or execution application, the time during which the stay order was in effect shall be excluded when calculating the period of limitation.

If a plaintiff is required to give notice to the Government under Section 80 of the Civil Procedure Code, the period of notice shall be excluded when calculating the period of limitation for the suit.

Subsection (3) allows a receiver or liquidator, appointed during insolvency or winding-up proceedings, to exclude the period between the application date and appointment date, plus an additional three months, when calculating the period of limitation for filing a suit or execution.

To benefit from Section 15(4), two conditions must be met: the suit must be for possession by a purchaser from a sale in execution of a decree, and it must be a suit (not an application). If these conditions are satisfied, the time during which proceedings to set aside the sale were pursued shall be excluded.

In the case of Turner Morrison & Co. Ltd. v. Hungerford Investment Trust Ltd., AIR 1972 SC 1311, it was held that Section 15(5) of the Limitation Act, 1963 does not apply to incorporated companies or, alternatively, that incorporated companies must be considered residing in places where they conduct their activities. Thus, they are present in all those places, and Section 15(5) cannot be used to extend the limitation period.

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Section 16

Effect of Death on or Before the Accrual of Right to Sue:

(1) When a person who, if alive, would have the right to initiate a suit or file an application dies before the right becomes valid, or when a right to initiate a suit or file an application arises only upon a person's death, the limitation period will begin from the time when there is a legal representative of the deceased who can initiate such a suit or file such an application.

(2) If a person against whom, if alive, a right to initiate a suit or file an application would have arisen dies before the right becomes valid, or when a right to initiate a suit or file an application against a person arises upon their death, the limitation period will begin from the time when there is a legal representative of the deceased against whom the plaintiff can initiate such a suit or file such an application.

(3) Subsections (1) and (2) do not apply to suits aimed at enforcing preemption rights or suits for the possession of immovable property or a hereditary office.

Section 22

Continuing Breaches and Torts:

In cases of ongoing breaches of contracts or persistent torts, a new limitation period commences with each passing moment during which the breach or tort continues.

According to Section 22 of the Limitation Act, 1963, in situations involving ongoing breaches of contracts or persistent torts, a fresh limitation period initiates with every passing moment while the breach or tort is ongoing. This section specifically addresses situations of continuing breaches of contracts and not instances of successive breaches of contracts.

The term "continuing breach of contract" or "continuing tort" implies that if an act or omission by an individual continues to result in a breach of contract or harm, and if this act or omission persists from one day to the next, a new cause of action arises each day on which the act or omission persists.

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Section 22 of the Limitation Act pertains to ongoing breaches of contracts and continuous torts. It allows for legal actions to seek compensation for acts that would not be actionable without special damages. This section recognizes that liabilities for damages or compensation may continue to accrue over time due to ongoing breaches of contracts and torts.

A continuing tort refers to a continuous "wrong." Section 22 specifically addresses situations of ongoing wrongs or torts. A continuing wrong gives rise to an ongoing source of injury, holding the wrongdoer responsible and liable for the sustained injury.

Even if the damage resulting from the act continues, if the wrongful act causes a complete injury, there is no ongoing wrong. An example of a continuing wrong is the infringement of a trademark.

In the case of Bengal Waterproof Ltd. v. Bombay Waterproof Mfg. Co., AIR 1997 SC 1398, it was established that filing an initial lawsuit based on trademark infringement and passing off actions does not bar the filing of a second lawsuit for ongoing acts of trademark infringement occurring after the initiation of the first lawsuit.

Section 25

Acquisition of Easement by Prescription:

(1) When access to and use of light or air for a building have been peacefully enjoyed as an easement, as a matter of right, without interruption, and for a continuous period of twenty years, or when any way, watercourse, or the use of water or any other easement (whether affirmative or negative) has been peacefully and openly enjoyed by someone claiming it as an easement and as a right, without interruption, and for a continuous period of twenty years, the right to such access, use of light or air, way, watercourse, or other easement shall become absolute and irrevocable.

(2) Each of these twenty-year periods shall be considered as ending within two years immediately prior to the commencement of the lawsuit in which the claim relating to that period is contested.

(3) In cases where the property over which such a right is claimed under sub-section (1) belongs to the Government, the reference to "twenty years" shall be replaced with "thirty years."

Explanation - An interruption, as mentioned in this section, only occurs when there is an actual cessation of possession or enjoyment due to obstruction caused by someone other than the claimant. Such obstruction must be acknowledged or acquiesced in for one year after the claimant becomes aware of it and of the person responsible for the obstruction.

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Section 26

Exclusion in Favor of Reversionary or Servient Tenement:

When any land or water, over which an easement has been enjoyed or derived, is held under or by virtue of any interest for life or a term of years exceeding three years from the time it was granted, the period during which the easement was enjoyed during the existence of such interest or term will not be counted when determining the twenty-year period if the claim is contested within three years after the termination of such interest or term by the person entitled to the said land or water upon its termination.

Section 27

Extinguishment of Right to Property:

Upon the expiration of the prescribed period for bringing a lawsuit for possession of any property, the right of any person to such property will be extinguished.

This provision deviates from the general principle that limitation laws only bar remedies and do not extinguish titles. It operates as a law of limitation and prescription. While it extinguishes the title of the rightful owner, it does not specify where such right vests.

Therefore, upon the extinguishment of the rightful owner's title, the title to the property will follow possession, and the person in possession as a trespasser will be considered to have acquired title through adverse possession. The right extinguished by Section 27 of the Limitation Act is the right held by the lawful owner against whom a claim of adverse possession is made.

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Madina Begam v. Shiv Murthy Prasad Pandey, 2016 (4) JBCJ 63 SC – This case followed the decision of the 3-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in Ahmadsahab Abdul Mulla (Dead) v. Bibijan and Others.

It addressed the question of whether the use of the expression "date" in Article 54 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act implies a specific date on the calendar.

The Supreme Court held that the expression "date fixed for performance" signifies a specific, crystallized date. When a date is fixed, it denotes a definite date assigned for performing a particular action, implying a specified date on the calendar.

Section 29

Provisions for Special and Local Laws:

1. The provisions of this Act shall not affect Section 25 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872.
2. When any special or local law prescribes a specific limitation period for any suit, appeal, or application that differs from the period specified in the schedule, the provisions in Sections 4 to 24 of this Act shall apply only to the extent they are not explicitly excluded by such special or local law when determining the applicable limitation period.
3. Except as provided in any prevailing law concerning marriage and divorce, this Act shall not be applicable to suits or other proceedings governed by such laws.
4. Sections 25 and 26, along with the definition of "easement" in section 2, shall not apply to cases arising in the territories where the Indian Easements Act, 1882 is currently in force.

In cases governed by special laws, the specified limitation periods under those laws shall prevail over the limitations provided in the Limitation Act. It is important to note that the provisions of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act will be excluded only if the Special Act explicitly excludes their application.

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Article 136 of the Schedule of Limitation Act

Article 136 of the Limitation Act 1963 establishes a 12-year time frame for the execution of any decree or court order.

The limitation period begins from the moment when the decree or order becomes enforceable, or when it instructs a payment of money or the delivery of property to be made on a specified date or at recurring intervals. In cases where default occurs in making the required payment or delivery, and execution is sought, the limitation period starts.

However, it's important to note that there is no specific limitation period for applying for the enforcement or execution of a decree that grants perpetual injunction.

To determine whether a decree was immediately executable, the key criterion is whether the fulfillment of the condition depended solely on the decree holder's discretion. If the execution was not within the decree holder's control and relied on external circumstances, the limitation period would not commence until those external circumstances were met.

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Adverse Possession

Under the previous Act, all lawsuits seeking possession, whether grounded in proprietary ownership or prior possession, fell under the purview of Article 142. This applied when a plaintiff, while in possession, was dispossessed or had their possession discontinued. If the case did not involve the plaintiff's dispossession or cessation of possession, Article 142 did not apply.

Actions based solely on ownership rights, not arising from dispossession or cessation of possession, were governed by Article 144, unless they were explicitly covered by other Articles, such as 47, 136, 137, 138, 140, and 141.

Under the old Act, in all possession-based suits arising from dispossession, regardless of the plaintiff's ownership rights, the burden of proof rested with the plaintiff to demonstrate their possession within 12 years prior to the lawsuit.

In the current Act, a lawsuit grounded in ownership, even when dispossession is alleged, can only be defeated by the defendant if they can prove that their possession had become adverse to the plaintiff for over 12 years before the lawsuit. Under the present Act, the plaintiff only needs to establish their ownership rights and is not obligated to demonstrate possession within 12 years before filing the suit.

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Scope of Article 142 & 144

In the case of Gurbinder Singh and Another v. Lal Singh and Another (AIR 1965 SC. 1553), the following facts were presented:

Mst. Raj Kaur held various lands under different tenures from the Raja of Faridkot. She had two daughters, one of whom adopted the son of the other daughter and put him in possession of all the lands.

Later, the adopted son transferred a portion of the lands to the second respondent, who was the son of the other daughter of Raj Kaur. After Raj Kaur's death, the Raja filed suits to claim possession of the land and eventually gained possession of the entire property in October 1938 through execution of the decrees.

He then transferred the land, but the transferee was dispossessed by the appellants in June 1950 due to a preemption suit they filed against the transferee. In February 1950, the sons of the second respondent's deceased mother, the first and second respondents, filed a lawsuit to claim possession of the entire land as heirs of Raj Kaur.

However, the decree was only granted for their half share, and this decision was affirmed by the High Court. In the appeal to the Supreme Court, it was argued that the suit was governed either by Article 142 or Article 144 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, and, in either case, was time-barred.

Decision:

Article 142 - To apply this article, the plaintiff must have initially been in possession of the property and must have been dispossessed by the defendant or someone through whom the defendant claims. Alternatively, the plaintiff should have discontinued possession. In this case, it was not argued that the first respondent was ever in possession of the property.

Regarding the second respondent's possession of a portion of the property at one point, it was due to a transfer by the adopted son. However, the current claim was based on succession under a different title altogether. Therefore, it was determined that the plaintiffs-respondents, as heirs of Raj Kaur, were never in possession of the land.

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Computation of Time Limits

Part III, Sections 12-24 of the Limitation Act, 1963, delineate the rules for calculating the time limits for various legal actions. These sections serve to either exclude certain time periods from the calculation of limitation or to delay the starting point of limitation.

Among these sections, Sections 12-15 of the Limitation Act specifically deal with the exclusion of time when computing the legally prescribed period of limitation.

These provisions, among other things, exclude the following time periods from the calculation of limitation:

1. The day on which the limitation period begins.
2. The day on which a judgment, order, award, or sentence is pronounced.
3. The time spent obtaining a copy of a decree, order, award, or se entence.
4. The time spent pursuing an application for indigent status (permission to sue without payment of court fees).
5. The time spent in good faith during proceedings in a court that lacks jurisdiction.
6. The duration during which a stay order or injunction is in effect.
7. The time spent giving notice or obtaining the necessary consent or sanction as required by law.
8. The period in which a receiver or liquidator is in place.
9. The time during which proceedings to set aside a sale were pending (in cases involving claims for possession).
10. The time during which the defendant was absent from India.

Sections 16-23 of the Limitation Act, 1963, pertain to the postponement of limitation. To trigger the law of limitation, there must be a completed cause of action, which entails having a plaintiff or defendant with the capacity to sue or be sued and a valid cause of action on which to base a lawsuit, appeal, or application. Additionally, such parties must be able to initiate the legal proceeding without hindrance or impediment.

Under these sections:

1. The limitation period will not commence until there is a party who can bring a lawsuit or be sued.
2. In cases involving fraud or mistake, the limitation period remains postponed until the discovery of such fraud or mistake.
3. For rights or liabilities, a new limitation period starts from the date of a written acknowledgment of the right or liability by the party.
4. For debts, a fresh limitation period begins upon payment of the debt.
5. When a new plaintiff or defendant is added or substituted after a suit is filed, the suit is considered to have been initiated against them when they are included as parties. However, if the court finds that this omission was due to a bona fide mistake, the suit is deemed to have been initiated on an earlier date.
6. In cases of continuing breaches of contract or torts, a new limitation period starts with each ongoing breach or tort.
7. For suits seeking compensation for an act that is not actionable without special damage, the limitation period commences from the time when the injury occurs.

Conclusion:

Limitation Act is important for all the Judiciary aspirants. Make sure you note all the important sections, and make your own notes for judiciary preparation. For Judiciary exams you must also go through the previous year papers and note the sections and topics that were asked in previous years.

For judiciary exams, law school exams and other law exams, you must understand all the topics in depth with proper research.

Read all the case alws. when you write answers for mains or any written examination, you have to support your answers with relavent case laws.

Use the notes in this blog for reference.

All the Best for Judiciary Preparation.